Nagorno Karabakh War: Observations and Lessons

The Nagorno Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan in late 2020 was the latest in a chain of armed conflicts that started in the late 1980's. The latest war resulted in a decisive victory by Azerbaijan, which reclaimed an important part of the occupied terrain in the region. 

The war has been subject to many debates and research on the future of warfare, particularly the role of armed drones. Azerbaijan had extensively deployed different types of armed and kamikaze drones and published footage of attacks conducted with these systems as part of a propaganda campaign. Artillery systems, especially long-range indirect firing have played major role in eliminating enemy troops and taking out camps, depots, and installations. These highlights shed light on the trends and the direction of modern warfare and how wars of the near future will likely be fought.

Background – Balance of Power

According to the 2020 edition of The Military Balance by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), before the outbreak of the war, Azerbaijani Armed Forces had a personnel total of approximately 70,000 soldiers, with a reserve force of 300,000 reservists. The command structure of the land forces, which had 56,850 personnel, consisted of five corps and 23 mechanized and light brigades.

Thanks to an increase in income from energy resources, Azerbaijan has managed to steadily increase their budget for armament for the past ten years. The 2019 defense budget was approximately US$ 1.8 billion. The most important arms supplier has been Israel: According to SIPRI data, between 2015 and 2019, 60% of Azerbaijan's arms imports came from Israel. Russia follows Israel with a share of 31%. Among the systems received from Israel are many different types of drones, Spike long-range anti-tank guided missiles, Harop, Orbiter and SkyStriker type kamikaze drones, modern artillery and surface to surface rocket systems. Azerbaijan procured T-90 modern main battle tanks, Mi-35M attack helicopters, various types of artillery and air defense systems from Russia.

As of September 2020, the Azerbaijan Land Forces, had nearly 450 main battle tanks, mostly T-72 and T-90, around 900 armored combat vehicles and personnel carriers, around 600 self-propelled and towed guns, and mortars. The artillery force was supplemented by Israeli-made LORA and Russian-made 9K79 Tochka (NATO code SS-21 "Scarab") tactical ballistic missile systems. Azerbaijan Air Force had 15 MiG-29 multi-role fighters, 21 Su-24 and Su-25 attack aircraft, as well as 26 upgraded Mi-24 attack helicopters. In addition, many Heron, Hermes 450, Hermes 900 and Aerostar drones were procured from Israel; Azerbaijan also started to manufacture Orbiter series kamikaze drones under license.

According to The Military Balance 2020, Armenian armed forces consisted of 44,800 personnel as of 2020, with 210,000 reservists. Almost all of the weapons and equipment of the Armenian armed forces are of Russian origin. The 2019 defense budget was approximately US$ 644 million. The country's general economic conditions and the size of its defense budget have been modest at best, compared to Azerbaijan.

Land forces of Armenia, with 22,900 personnel, consist of five mechanized corps with an inventory of more than 100 tanks, almost all of which are T-72 models, around 400 armored combat vehicles and personnel carriers, around 150 self-propelled and towed guns and around 60 artillery rocket systems. The land forces also had eight 9K72 Elbrus (NATO code SS-1C "Scud B"), four 9K79 Tochka (NATO code SS-21 "Scarab") and four 9K720 Iskander E (NATO code SS-26 "Stone) tactical ballistic missile systems.

As of September 2020, Armenia has 14 Su-25 (NATO code "Frogfoot") attack aircraft, ten of which were purchased from Slovakia in 2005. Armenia received four modern Su-30SM type multi role combat aircraft from the Russian Federation in late 2019. The air defense umbrella was formed with various radar and infrared guided air defense systems, especially the S-300 (NATO code SA-10 "Grumble"). In late 2019, modern low-altitude air defense systems of the Tor M2KM type were purchased from the Russian Federation.

There is no reliable open-source information on the armed power of breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh. It is generally believed that almost all of the equipment and weapons were transferred from the Armenian army. Before the war, the main battle tank inventory, consisting entirely of T-72s, was between 200 and 300; It is considered that there are approximately the same number of armored combat vehicles and personnel carriers and more than 200 artillery elements. The number of personnel under arms is estimated at around 20,000.

The Outcome

Both parties have contradictory statements on their personnel losses, but open-source photographic material shows that Armenia has lost more than 40 percent of its army inventory, especially in terms of armored vehicles and artillery units. The Armenian army and Armenian forces in Nagorno Karabakh have lost more than 250 main battle tanks, 160 armored vehicles, more than 300 artillery systems, more than 20 early warning radars and electronic warfare systems, and more than 700 trucks and other vehicles. Based on open-source visual information, Armenian personnel loss is estimated as around 5,000, which corresponds to 10% of the total number of soldiers of the Armenian and so-called Nagorno-Karabakh armies. Azerbaijan’s personnel losses are slightly lower, with the officially declared number being close to 3,000. In terms of equipment, Azerbaijan suffered considerably lower losses: More than 60 main battle tanks, around 100 armored vehicles and around 100 other types of vehicles have been destroyed, as per open-source material.

Lessons and Observations

The huge difference between the number of equipment losses on both sides is mainly because of the coordinated use of drones and artillery systems by Azerbaijan. In terms of artillery systems, Azerbaijan extensively used non-line of sight (NLOS) guided missiles, artillery rockets and tactical ballistic missiles against time critical and stationary targets, often well deep within enemy territory. These systems were supported by effective deployment of electronic warfare and reconnaissance systems. 

The Role of Drones

Azerbaijan acquired Bayraktar TB2 armed drones from Türkiye in 2020 and utilized them effectively in strike missions. Except for Bayraktar TB2, Azerbaijan's drone inventory consisted entirely of Israeli designed and produced surveillance and kamikaze drones. The intelligence and surveillance drone fleet consisted of the Hermes family, while the kamikaze drone force was formed with Harop, Orbiter and SkyStrikers.

The TB2s, which had previously been effectively used in conflicts in Syria and Libya was deployed with MAM-L laser guided precision munitions. From the released footage, it was observed that the TB2s mostly targeted Armenian air defense systems, artillery batteries and outposts. In many cases, TB2s were used in coordination with kamikaze drones. The Armenian air defense network has largely failed to detect and intercept these drones.

Thanks to the successful DEAD (destruction of enemy air defense) campaign by armed and kamikaze drones in the early stages of the war, in the subsequent phase of the war Azerbaijan achieved relative ease in operating along the front line. Attacks began to focus on Armenian mechanized and artillery units. The Armenian side showed significant lack of skill in adopting to the dynamic environment of the battleground and coordination of troops. Azerbaijan’s excessive deployment of electronic warfare further contributed to the lack of coordination and communication of the Armenian forces. As a result, Armenia lost more than half of its main battle tank and artillery inventory. 

According to open-source analysis, Azerbaijan used the ancient Antonov An-2 transport aircraft, as bait to lure air defenses, in attempt to force them to open their radars, thereby compromising their locations. An-2, a large and slow flying aircraft, can easily be detected and mistaken as a drone flying at similar speeds. As a matter of fact, it was seen that the Armenian air defense shot down some An-2s in this way. This is a remarkable practice, reminiscent of Israel's tactics against Syrian air defense in the 1982 Lebanon War.

Heavy casualties inflicted on tanks and armored vehicles by armed and kamikaze drones have triggered discussions about the position of tanks in the modern battlefield. According to one view, the era of large and heavy tanks is now over with armed drones. According to another view, the main difference is the integration of the elements and sensors on the battlefield with each other, in other words, the provision of uninterrupted and fast data communication.

Ballistic Missiles

The Nagorno Karabakh War witnessed the use of tactical ballistic missiles by both sides. Azerbaijan struck Armenia's S-300 air defense system and a bridge with Israeli-made LORA tactical ballistic missiles. Armenia, on the other hand, attacked civilian settlements such as Ganja and Mingachevir with Tochka U and Scud missiles. Many civilians lost their lives and were injured in these attacks.

As seen in the Syrian Civil War and the conflicts in Yemen, the use of tactical ballistic missiles in interstate conflicts and civil wars is becoming increasingly common. Especially in conflicts in which at least one of the parties is a non-state armed actor, these types of weapons, which are relatively easy to access and use, and have high mobility due to their vehicle-mounted capability, can be used quickly against civilian settlements or infrastructure. Establishing an effective defense against such missiles is costly and difficult. Long-range air defense systems such as the S-300/400, Patriot, SAMP/T need to be supported by a command control and early warning network. In the absence of an air defense umbrella with such qualities, tactical ballistic missiles can cause great destruction, especially against civilians.

Social Media and Propaganda

Finally, it is noteworthy that both sides used social media intensively during the war. The operations organized, the targets hit, the losses inflicted on the other side, and the morale and motivation-boosting content were circulated through popular social media channels such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. In fact, the relevant ministries and officials of both countries preferred to first publish their press releases and announcements through these channels.

The parties regularly shared information visuals (infographics) and maps about the situation in the field about the casualties they inflicted on the other side. Verifying the accuracy of the content is a serious challenge for independent observers and researchers, as there is little to no unbiased information flow from the field. This gives both sides a wide room to maneuver to form and manage public opinion and to defend their arguments, especially on international platforms.

In particular Azerbaijan's publication of images of hits and destruction obtained from armed and kamikaze drones gave it a distinct advantage on the psychological front. In addition to gaining the upper hand in morale, these images cast a shadow over the reliability of the statements and data published by the Armenian side and provided a psychological advantage for Azerbaijan.

In conclusion, the Nagorno-Karabakh War 2020 offers a lot of data and clues about the changing nature of war. It is an important case that military techniques and technologies have important effects and repercussions not only on the field and on the tactical scale, but also they also play a role diplomatic and geopolitical layers as well